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Abstract 
This paper demonstrates a non-cooperative four rational player¶V static game framework to 
analyse the shipping alliance competition on a particular Far East-Northern Europe liner 
shipping service loop. The complete-perfect information case of the players is taken into 
account and the Cournot-Nash equilibrium pure strategy solution concept is utilised. The 
approach developed in this study focuses on the current liner shipping alliance structure and 
assumes the long term stability of the current alliances. The research steps are 
mathematically integrated to different methodological outcomes and numerically tested in 
the given case study. The results suggested that, in a two year period, additional ship 
capacity deployment would reduce the competitiveness of the alliances. It is proposed that 
outcomes of this research will provide significant theoretical contribution to the existing 
literature and will generate a robust tactical decision support rationale regarding to the 
capacity deployment problem of the liner container shipping industry. 
Keywords: Shipping Alliances, Cournot Oligopoly, Liner Shipping, Competition Analysis, 
Capacity Deployment 
1. Introduction 
The liner container shipping industry plays a critical role in the viability of the international 
trade. Therefore, the market behaviours and allocation of the liner shipping services is a 
great interest of the global trade actors. Historically, the liner container shipping market was 
controlled by conference monopolies until the anti-trust legal enforcements ended their 
cartels. A very long period of time, the shipping liners had been exempted from anti-trust 
legislations of the trade law and freight rate fixing were allowed. In 1990s the freight rate 
fixing was banned and the liner shipping conferences were replaced by the shipping 
alliances which have been established to respond the requirements of slot chartering, sharing 
capital investment risks, improvement of the network coverage, and support of strategic 
operational and management decisions among cooperative competitor container shipping 
liners (UNCTAD, 2014; Shi and Voss, 2011). The liner shipping alliances utilises strategic 
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decision makings and tactical planning of members in order to gain operational flexibility, 
sustainability and cost efficiency due to the shared utilisation service capabilities. The liner 
shipping alliances have experienced competitive developments and evolutions since 1995. In 
1998, due to cross-alliance mergers and acquisitions, the form of shipping alliances changed 
and The New World Alliance replaced Global Alliance (Doi et al., 2000). This trend was 
spread on other alliances and FRQWLQXHG XQWLO &KLQD¶V UHMHFWLRQ RI WKH 3LRQHHU 3 shipping 
alliance network. Thus, the shipping liners were enforced to develop new perspectives for 
their strategic alliances. As shown in the following Table, in 2015 the shipping alliances 
were shaped as four competitors as a consequence of the rejection of the P3 alliance.  
Table.1 Historical development of the shipping alliances 
Source: Adapted from (Panayides and Wiedmar, 2011; Shi and Voss, 2008) 
1995-1996 1998-2001 2005-2010 2010-2013 2013-2014 2015-? 
Grand  
Hapag Lloyd, NOL, 
NYK, P&O 
Grand 
Hapag Lloyd, NOL, 
NYK, P&O, 
Nedlloyd, OOCL 
Grand 
Hapag Lloyd, CP, 
NYK, MISC, OOCL 
Grand 
Hapag Lloyd, NYK, 
OOCL 
Grand 6 
Hapag Lloyd, NYK, 
OOCL, MOL, APL, 
HMM 
Grand 6 (G6) 
Hapag Lloyd, NYK, 
OOCL, MOL, APL, 
HMM 
Global 
MOL, APL, 
Nedlloyd, MISC, 
OOCL 
The New World 
MOL, APL, MISC 
The New World 
MOL, APL, HMM 
The New World 
MOL, APL, HMM 
CKY 
&RVFR³.´/LQH
YML 
CKY 
&RVFR³.´/LQH
YML 
CKYH 
&RVFR³.´/LQH
YML, Hanjin 
CKYH 
&RVFR³.´/LQH
YML, Hanjin 
CKYHE 
&RVFR³.´/LQH
YML, Hanjin, 
Evergreen 
CKYHE 
&RVFR³.´/LQH
YML, Hanjin, 
Evergreen 
United: 
Cho Yang, Hanjin, 
DSR 
United: 
Cho Yang, Hanjin, 
DSR 
Evergreen Evergreen Evergreen Evergreen 
Maersk & Sea Line Maersk & Sea Line Maersk & Sea Line,  
P&O, Nedlloyd 
APM Maersk Pioneer 3 
APM Maersk, MSC, 
CMA CGM 
2M 
APM Maersk, MSC  
  
MSC MSC MSC MSC 
CMA CGM CMA CGM CMA CGM CMA CGM Ocean 3 (O3) 
CMA CGM, UASC, 
CSCL 
UASC UASC UASC UASC UASC 
CSCL CSCL CSCL CSCL CSCL 
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Nowadays, the rationale behind strategic cooperation in the liner container shipping business 
is efficient capacity utilisation of the fleets owned by individual shipping liners by aiming to 
prevent the negative impacts of the ship size enlargement trend. The research effort on the 
capacity deployment is associated with the recent developments of the liner shipping.  One 
of the main obstacles in the liner container shipping industry is the regulatory enforcement 
of the International Maritime organization (IMO). The energy efficiency, emission, and 
sustainability regulations of IMO required significant operational effort and investment of 
the shipping liners in order to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, to save energy and 
to contribute to the marine sustainability. Another obstacle that the industry faces is the 
overcapacity of ship capacity supply to the market due to the enlargement of the ship size 
which also causes operational problems for the ports such as draft, handling and port traffic. 
In addition, instability of bunker prices drives the innovation requirements for energy 
efficiency of existing marine and structural systems and available bunkering sources. Due to 
the capacity oversupply, freight rates in low levels and threatens the financial stability of the 
liner shipping companies. All these obstacles have a huge influence on the liner shipping 
competition outcomes for global trade and competitiveness level of the players in the liner 
shipping market.  
The present market tolerance is a significant indicator of the optimal ship size determination. 
Therefore, optimal capacity deployment via optimal average ship size selection needs to 
maintain the market based perspective of the liner container shipping services. The liner 
container shipping alliances are established to provide better utilisation of the mega 
container vessels. However, the additional capacity investment of individual alliance 
members requires a narrow research focus on their mega vessel newbuilding orders as well 
as the financial consequences of their capacity deployment decision making rationales.   
This paper presents a game theoretical methodology of non-cooperative four rational 
SOD\HUV¶ROLJRSROLVtic competition in order to adapt to the practical liner service loop cases. 
The study considers recent four shipping alliances as fully rational heterogeneous players 
and generates a tactical decision making concept regarding to the capacity deployment of the 
shipping alliances. In chapter 2, brief literature and milestones of the subject investigated is 
given. In chapter 3, the methodology of the study is established based on the influence of the 
tactical behaviours of competitors, their related cost elements and oligopolistic market price 
mechanism. In chapter 4, the methodology is applied to a hypothetical Far East- North 
Europe liner service loop case study. In chapter 5, results of the case study are analysed and 
discussed. In chapter 6, conclusion of the research and future research direction are given.   
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2. Literature Review 
A wide academic literature exists regarding to competition analysis and capacity deployment 
problem of the liner shipping. Panayides and Cullinane (2002) addressed strategic issues of 
the liner shipping competition. They clarified theoretical background of competitive 
advantage in liner shipping industry by applying the famous management guru Michael E. 
3RUWHU¶V LGHDV DQG UHVRXUFH EDVHG YLHZ ,Q DGGLWLRQ DV 6ULYDVWDYD et al (2001) mentioned 
market based view and as Grant (1996) explained knowledge-based (technology) view  
should be considered as other theories could be applied to the liner container shipping in 
order to gain competitive advantage. Progoulaki and Theotokas (2010) investigated the 
resource based view in shipping competitiveness. In their research they adapted the resource 
based view to human source and crew management sections of a shipping company in order 
to gain competitive advantage. Greeve (2009) mostly focused on the impact of innovation on 
the shipping competitiveness and compared the diffusion of panamax container ships with 
double hull oil tankers. In another similar study, Poulis et al (2013) compared 
competitiveness of shipping companies in consideration of their information communication 
technologies. On the other hand, majority of the studies in the literature utilised market 
based view. Dimitriu et al (2007) utilised agent based simulation and game theory approach 
in order to generate a competitive short sea passenger shipping network. In terms of liner 
container shipping, Yong (1996) carried out a game theoretic research on the competition 
among three deep sea shipping liners where the shipping liners are determined as an 
incumbent firm, a potential entrant and a buyer. His results claimed that exclusive dealing 
contracts could be significant market barriers to entry when the entrant player has a limited 
capacity.  
Some innovative ideas were also applied on the differentiation strategies of the liner 
container shipping. Acciaro (2011) proposed a liner container shipping service differential 
model based on advance booking.  His model included different pricing for loyal customers 
DQGLQWHJUDWHGORJLVWLFVHUYLFHSURYLGHU¶VFXVWRPHUUHODWLRQVVWUDWHJLHVWRWKHVKLSSLQJOLQHUV
In a recent study Linstad et al (2016) suggested that shipping liners could provide two 
different kinds of liner services in order to satisfy different customer requirements on the 
same liner service loop: one fast and one relatively slow service in terms of transit time. 
Their approach suggested that while fast service with higher price would be more 
competitive against air freight and fast moving goods, the slow service would be more 
competitive against traditional general cargo and minor bulk trade. In addition, Zang and 
Lam (2015) analysed impacts of high liner shipping sailing schedule with high frequency for 
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shippers and consignees. Their numerical analysis indicated that high liner shipping 
frequency is very significant for the products have high value density, high inventory cost, 
low demand variability and high service level requirement. The study was in favour of the 
shipping alliance ideology based on increasing the liner shipping port call frequency on a 
certain liner service loop and creating differentiation.  
The cost reduction is one of the main motivations behind of competitiveness researches on 
liner shipping industry. Main costs of a liner shipping company are voyage costs, 
operational costs, capital costs, and additional costs (Gkonis and Psaraftis, 2007; Stopford, 
2009). Especially voyage optimisation methods are very popular approaches in order to 
minimise the operation cost of the liner shipping management.  For instance, in a recent 
study, Wang et al (2015) carried out a detailed investigation on the seasonal revenue 
management of a shipping liner management. They developed a mixed integer linear 
programming profit maximisation model with a convex objective function based on a 
tailored branch and bound method. Their numerical applications showed that how the 
optimal solution changed the cost variations in bunker price, demand and freight rate.   
In addition to these researches, a variety of academic research has been published on the 
application of the game theoretical analysis to liner shipping service transport network and 
the stability of strategic shipping alliances in 2000s. Song and Panayides (2002) developed a 
conceptual framework of application of cooperative game theory on liner shipping alliances 
to indicate cooperation pay offs among shipping alliance members. Abito (2005) modelled 
excess capacity in the liner shipping alliances with non-cooperative two player game theory. 
He assumed price as equal to cost per container slot in his model. He emphasised that an 
agreement without explicit control on the investment would cause capacity oversupply and 
less cost efficiency. Shi and Voss (2011) provided a survey on game theoretical approaches 
within the shipping industry. Agarwal and Ergun (2010) applied mathematical programming 
and game theory to address tactical problems such as liner container shipping network 
design mechanism. Panayides and Wiedmer (2011) studied three big alliances in deep sea 
liner container shipping and compared their operational performance to each other. Ding and 
Liang (2005) focused on the partner selection for shipping alliances. They used fuzzy 
MCDA methodology to assist the partner selection process. Kuo and Luo (2015) 
investigated overcapacity supply and developed a two-player game theory model to analyse 
the outcomes of uncoordinated optimal ship capacity investment strategies under perfect 
competition. Their results suggested that the ship capacity investment has higher benefits 
with reduction of the bunker consumption and increase of the energy efficiency.  
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3. Methodology 
Methodological aspect of this paper addresses practical capacity deployment rationales of 
the shipping alliances based on the December 2015 alliance structures. It also adapts the 
static Cournot heterogeneous four player capacity allocation game concept to the shipping 
liner alliance market competition with an integrated research framework. The mathematical 
steps of the methodology generated includes cost calculations of the players, Cournot 
competition optimal capacity deployment and freight mechanism, additional capacity 
increase or capacity reduction decision scenarios, Nash pure solutions for the complete 
information state of the players. By this methodological application, it is aimed to determine 
the equilibrium points of the market for different decision making alternatives. The 
methodological steps of the paper could be simplified as in the following figure.  
 
Figure 1 ± Methodology of the study 
The Cournot competition model is commonly applied for the case of oligopolistic control of 
a group of firms on the freight determination in a particular market. This study assumes the 
deep sea liner container shipping market as a four player oligopoly consisting of the existing 
shipping alliances which can be called ³DOOLDQFH quadropoly´. The study disregards 
cooperation at any level between alliances and individual alliance members and assumes a 
perfect competition among alliances where a complete information flow is provided.  
In the case of four non-cooperative fully competing players, let ݍఏሺݐሻ ? ߠ ൌ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? indicates 
the ship capacity deployments of the quadropolistic competition counterparties during a 
certain ݐ time period in the market boundaries. It is assumed that the freight of the liner 
shipping services ܲ has a direct mathematical relationship with total deployed shipping 
capacityܳ ൌ  ? ݍఏସఏୀଵ  through inverse demand functionܲ ൌ ݂ିଵሺܳሻ of economy theory 
which is a linear function assisting to simplify and explain the capacity-freight relationship. 
The average shipment price (ocean freight) of the liner service on a specific loop that 
Step 1 ȈCournot competition model of four player's game  
Step 2 
ȈCost calculations of alliances on a particular liner service loop 
Step 3 
ȈAdditional ship capacity allocation-investment  tactical decision making  
scenario 
Step 4 
ȈNash  equilibrium of tactical strategy combinations  
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quadropoly supply can be shown as ܲ ൌ ܽ െ ܾଵݍଵ െ ܾଶݍଶ െ ܾଷݍଷ െ ܾସݍସ where ܽ is a 
constant parameter that representing the market behaviour, and ܾଵ  ? ଶܾ  ? ଷܾ  ? ସܾ are the constant 
slopes of the market IURP HDFK SOD\HU¶V PDUNHW SRVLWLRQ. In order to calculate the profit 
functions of the players, let the average container port-to-port shipment round trip cost 
function of the players be ܥఏሺݍఏሻ ൌ ܿఏݍఏ  ? ߠ ൌ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?and revenue of the players be ݍఏ  ? ߠ ൌ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Therefore, the profit function of player 1 isߨଵ ൌ ܲݍଵ െ ܿଵݍଵ, the profit 
function of player 2 isߨଶ ൌ ܲݍଶ െ ܿଶݍଶ, the profit function of player 3 isߨଷ ൌ ܲݍଷ െܿଷݍଷ, and the profit function of the player 4 isߨସ ൌ ܲݍସ െ ܿସݍସ. Then it is possible to 
formulate the profit functions of the each player as below.  ߨଵ ൌ ሺܽ െ ܾଵݍଵ െ ܾଶݍଶ െ ܾଷݍଷ െ ܾସݍସ െ ܿଵሻݍଵ ߨଶ ൌ ሺܽ െ ܾଵݍଵ െ ܾଶݍଶ െ ܾଷݍଷ െ ܾସݍସ െ ܿଶሻݍଶ ߨଷ ൌ ሺܽ െ ܾଵݍଵ െ ܾଶݍଶ െ ܾଷݍଷ െ ܾସݍସ െ ܿଷሻݍଷ ߨସ ൌ ሺܽ െ ܾଵݍଵ െ ܾଶݍଶ െ ܾଷݍଷ െ ܾସݍସ െ ܿସሻݍସ 
According to Cournot oligopoly model marginal profit functions or each player can be found 
as following (Elsadany, 2013). ׎ఏሺݍఏ  ? ܳି ఏሻ ߲ߨఏሺݍఏ  ? ܳି ఏሻ߲ݍఏ ൌ ܽ െ  ? ఏܾݍఏ െ ܾିఏܳିఏ െ ܿఏ ൌ  ? 
Where; ܳିఏ ൌ ෍ ݍఓସఓୀଵ ?ఏஷఓ  
Using the above model it is possible to show marginal profit of each counterparties of the 
quadropolistic game as follows. ߲ߨଵሺݍଵ  ? ܳି ଵሻ߲ݍଵ ൌ ܽ െ  ? ଵܾݍଵ െ ܾଶݍଶ െ ܾଷݍଷ െ ܾସݍସ െ ܿଵ ൌ  ? ߲ߨଶሺݍଶ  ? ܳି ଶሻ߲ݍଶ ൌ ܽ െ  ? ଶܾݍଶ െ ܾଵݍଵ െ ܾଷݍଷ െ ܾସݍସ െ ܿଶ ൌ  ? ߲ߨଷሺݍଷ  ? ܳି ଷሻ߲ݍଷ ൌ ܽ െ  ? ଷܾݍଷ െ ܾଵݍଵ െ ܾଶݍଶ െ ܾସݍସ െ ܿଷ ൌ  ? 
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߲ߨସሺݍସ  ? ܳି ସሻ߲ݍସ ൌ ܽ െ  ? ସܾݍସ െ ܾଵݍଵ െ ܾଶݍଶ െ ܾଷݍଷ െ ܿସ ൌ  ? 
Then the best response capacity allocations of each player can be written in the form of 
Cournot oligopoly model. ݍଵכ ൌ ܽ െ ܾଶݍଶ െ ܾଷݍଷ െ ܾସݍସ െ ܿଵ ? ଵܾ  ݍଶכ ൌ ܽ െ ܾଵݍଵ െ ܾଷݍଷ െ ܾସݍସ െ ܿଶ ? ଶܾ  ݍଷכ ൌ ܽ െ ܾଵݍଵ െ ܾଶݍଶ െ ܾସݍସ െ ܿଷ ? ଷܾ  ݍସכ ൌ ܽ െ ܾଵݍଵ െ ܾଶݍଶ െ ܾଷݍଷ െ ܿସ ? ସܾ  
In order to show mathematical relationship between optimal capacity deployment of the 
players and the fixed shipping price of four player oligopoly by Cournot model, the 
following equations are generated.  ݍଵכ ൌ ܲ െ ܾଵݍଵכ െ ܿଵ ? ଵܾ  ݍଶכ ൌ ܲ െ ܾଶݍଶכ െ ܿଶ ? ଶܾ  ݍଷכ ൌ ܲ െ ܾଷݍଷכ െ ܿଷ ? ଷܾ  ݍସכ ൌ ܲ െ ܾସݍସכ െ ܿସ ? ସܾ  
In final form of the equations, we can simply show the capacity allocations of the players as: ݍଵכ ൌ ܲ െ ܿଵ ? ଵܾ  ݍଶכ ൌ ܲ െ ܿଶ ? ଶܾ  
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ݍଷכ ൌ ܲ െ ܿଷ ? ଷܾ  ݍସכ ൌ ܲ െ ܿସ ? ସܾ  
In the existence of the allocated capacities, the above equations will assist us to find the ܾఏ 
slopes of the market (ߠ ൌ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?) for each players and to determine ܽ values of the market 
where fixed price per unit is known and cost per unit of each player is calculated.  
In the case of liner shipping services, in order to calculate the total cost ሺܶܥఏሻ of each player 
(ߠ ൌ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?) on a specific round trip service, with identical ships, it is required to calculate 
voyage costsሺܸܥఏሻ, operational costsሺܱܥఏሻ ? and capital costsሺܥܥఏሻ (Stopford, 2009). ܶܥఏ ൌ ܸܥఏ ൅ ܱܥఏ ൅ ܥܥఏ 
Simply the voyage cost of each player (ߠ ൌ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?) may be calculated as sum of the 
average bunker costsሺܤܥఏሻ , average port chargesሺܲܥఏሻ  and any required canal charges 
(ߛሻ. 
෍ ෍ ܸܥఏ௜௝௡௝ୀଶ௡ିଵ௜ୀଵ ൌ ෍ ෍ ܤܥఏ௜௝௡௝ୀଶ௡ିଵ௜ୀଵ ൅ ෍ ܲܥఏ௞௡௞ୀଵ ൅ ߛ 
The operational cost of players (ߠ ൌ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?) may be calculated as sum of manning cost ሺܯܥఏሻ, insurance cost ሺܫܥఏሻ, stores ሺܵܥఏሻ, maintenance ሺܯܣܥఏሻ, and administration costs ሺܣܦܥఏሻ. ܱܥఏ ൌ ܯܥఏ ൅ ܫܥఏ ൅ ܵܥఏ ൅ ܯܣܥఏ ൅ ܣܦܥఏ 
In order to calculate number of round trips for a ship per year, it is required to calculate total 
round trip time. The total rime requires for a liner service round trip is calculated as below.  
ܴ ఏܶ ൌ ෍ ෍ ܦఏ௜௝ఏܸ௜௝௡௝ୀଶ௡ିଵ௜ୀଵ ൅ ෍ ܲ ఏܶ௞௡௞ୀଵ ൅ ߪఏ 
Where; ܴ ఏܶ =Round trip time (hours) of the liner service of players 
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ܦఏ௜௝= Route distance between ݅௧௛ and ݆௧௛ port of call 
ఏܸ௜௝= Average speed between ݅௧௛ and ݆௧௛ port of call ܲ ఏܶ௞ =Average port time of ݇௧௛ port of call ߪఏ = Average total round trip delays from unexpected port waiting, maintenance and 
weather 
Capital cost per ship round trip of each player ሺܥܥఏሻ may be calculated with following 
formula forߠ ൌ ሺ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ሻ.  ܥܥఏ ൌ ܥ ఏܲ ൅ ݊ఏ כ ݎఏ כ ሺ ? ൅ ݎఏሻ௡ഇሺ ? ൅ ݎఏሻ௡ഇ െ  ?כ ݈ఏ 
Where; 
ܥ ఏܲ= Cash price of the average ship of each player 
ݎఏ= Interest rate of the average ship of the players for adequate time period 
݊ఏ = Number of instalment for each player 
݈ఏ= Loan of the players 
Then the number of round trips per year for a ship is ݕఏ ൌ ଷ଺ହכଶସோ்ഇ  with largest integer 
possible. If it is assumed that the liner service provides weekly service from each port of 
calls, it is required to allocate ݔఏ ൌ ହଶ௬ഇ  number of ships with largest integer possible. The 
total annual cost of a liner service loop for a shipping alliance/shipping liner is shown as 
below. ܿఏି஺௡௡௨௔௟ ൌ ሺݕఏ כ ݔఏ כ ܶܥఏሻ ൅ ܣܥఏ  ?ߠ ൌሺ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ሻ 
Where; 
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ܣܥఏ ൌ Annual additional costs per service loop   
Based on the given total annual cost, the average per container shipment cost ܿఏcould be 
shown as following. ܿఏ ൌ ௖ഇషಲ೙೙ೠೌ೗௬ഇכ௫ഇכ௤ഇכఠഇ  ?ߠ ൌሺ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ሻ 
Where; ߱ఏ= Capacity utilisation rate of the liner service of player ߠ 
Let ߜఏ is a particular additional capacity decision that shipping liners could employ on the 
liner shipping service by enlarging the average ship size. New capacity of a shipping 
alliance could be expressed as: ݍ ?ఏכ ൌ ݍఏכ ൅  ?ߜఏ 
Where;  ?ߜఏ is 0 or േߜఏ ݍ ?ఏכ  is capacity allocation of  in the new scenario. 
In final form of the previous equations, we can simply show the capacity allocations as: ݍ ?ఏכ ൌ ܲ ? െ ఏܿ ? ? ఏܾ  
Where; ߠ ൌ ሺ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ሻ ܲ ?is the new freight rates based on the capacity deployment decision ܿఏ ?is the new cost per container based on the capacity deployment decision. 
In heterogeneous four player game let the pure strategy set of the player ߠis denoted by ܵఏ ൌ ൛ݏఓఏหߤ߳ܯఏൟ with ܯఏ ൌ ሼ ? ?  ? ఏ݉ሽ where it is assumed that all players have ݉ఏ=2 
pure strategies in order to simplify the model. The set of all pure strategy profiles isܵ ൌ ? ܵఏସఏୀଵ . The profit payoff function of player ߠis denoted by ߨఏ  ? ܵ ՜ ܴ ?  
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It is possible to represent the total number of pure strategies in the quadropoly game as  ? ݉ఏସఏୀଵ  ?and pure strategy combinations in the game as ? ݉ఏସఏୀଵ . Thus, the number of pure 
strategies in game is 8 and the pure strategy combinations in the game is  ? ?  Briefly all pure 
strategy combinations in the game could be shown as following (Chatterjee, 2009).  ሺݏଵଵ  ? ݏଵଶ  ? ݏଵଷ  ? ݏଵସሻ ؔ ܥ݋ܾ݉݅݊ܽݐ݅݋݊ ? ሺݏଵଵ  ? ݏଶଶ  ? ݏଵଷ  ? ݏଵସሻ ؔ ܥ݋ܾ݉݅݊ܽݐ݅݋݊ ? ሺݏଵଵ  ? ݏଵଶ  ? ݏଶଷ  ? ݏଵସሻ ؔ ܥ݋ܾ݉݅݊ܽݐ݅݋݊ ? ሺݏଵଵ  ? ݏଵଶ  ? ݏଵଷ  ? ݏଶସሻ ؔ ܥ݋ܾ݉݅݊ܽݐ݅݋݊ ? ሺݏଵଵ  ? ݏଶଶ  ? ݏଶଷ  ? ݏଵସሻ ؔ ܥ݋ܾ݉݅݊ܽݐ݅݋݊ ? ሺݏଵଵ  ? ݏଶଶ  ? ݏଵଷ  ? ݏଶସሻ ؔ ܥ݋ܾ݉݅݊ܽݐ݅݋݊ ? ሺݏଵଵ  ? ݏଵଶ  ? ݏଶଷ  ? ݏଶସሻ ؔ ܥ݋ܾ݉݅݊ܽݐ݅݋݊ ? ሺݏଵଵ  ? ݏଶଶ  ? ݏଶଷ  ? ݏଶସሻ ؔ ܥ݋ܾ݉݅݊ܽݐ݅݋݊ ? 
ሺݏଶଵ  ? ݏଶଶ  ? ݏଶଷ  ? ݏଶସሻ ؔ ܥ݋ܾ݉݅݊ܽݐ݅݋݊ ? ሺݏଶଵ  ? ݏଵଶ  ? ݏଶଷ  ? ݏଶସሻ ؔ ܥ݋ܾ݉݅݊ܽݐ݅݋݊ ? ? ሺݏଶଵ  ? ݏଶଶ  ? ݏଵଷ  ? ݏଶସሻ ؔ ܥ݋ܾ݉݅݊ܽݐ݅݋݊ ? ? ሺݏଶଵ  ? ݏଶଶ  ? ݏଶଷ  ? ݏଵସሻ ؔ ܥ݋ܾ݉݅݊ܽݐ݅݋݊ ? ? ሺݏଶଵ  ? ݏଵଶ  ? ݏଵଷ  ? ݏଶସሻ ؔ ܥ݋ܾ݉݅݊ܽݐ݅݋݊ ? ? ሺݏଶଵ  ? ݏଵଶ  ? ݏଶଷ  ? ݏଵସሻ ؔ ܥ݋ܾ݉݅݊ܽݐ݅݋݊ ? ? ሺݏଶଵ  ? ݏଶଶ  ? ݏଵଷ  ? ݏଵସሻ ؔ ܥ݋ܾ݉݅݊ܽݐ݅݋݊ ? ? ሺݏଶଵ  ? ݏଵଶ  ? ݏଵଷ  ? ݏଵସሻ ؔ ܥ݋ܾ݉݅݊ܽݐ݅݋݊ ? ? 
Where; ݏఓఏ means ߬௧௛ pure strategy of ߠ௧௛ player and each player has 2 available strategies in a four 
player game for ߠ ൌ ሺ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ሻ and ߤ ൌ ሺ ? ? ?ሻ.  
With the given strategy combinations the utility profit payoff (ߨሻ combination matrix of the 
players in quadropoly is identified as below.  ߨଵଵ ߨଵଶ ߨଵଷߨଵସߨଶଵ ߨଶଶ ߨଶଷߨଶସߨଷଵ ߨଷଶ ߨଷଷߨଷସ  ڭ ڭ ڭڭߨଵହଵ ߨଵହଶ ߨଵହଷ ߨଵହସߨଵ଺ଵ ߨଵ଺ଶ ߨଵ଺ଵ ߨଵ଺ସ  
Where; ߨఛఏ means ߬௧௛ utility profit payoff of ߠ௧௛ player in  a four player¶V game with two strategy 
choices for ߠ ൌ ሺ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ሻ and ߬ ൌ ሺ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ?  ? ሻ. 
 The non-cooperative four player competition game 
of the liner shipping alliances 
Paper ID 171 
 
IAME 2016 Conference | August 23 - 26, 2016 | Hamburg, Germany  13 
F, the solution concept, is formulated asܨ ׷  ൛ݏଵఏ  ?  ? ݏఓఏ  ?  ?ߨଵఏ  ?  ?  ? ߨఛఏൟ ՜ ݏఓఏכ. The strategy 
combination ݏఓఏכis the Nash equilibrium if no player has incentive to deviate from his 
strategy given that the other players do not deviate from their strategies (Nash, 1950). 
Formally Nash equilibrium best response function of the game can be shown as follows: ׊ߠ ? ׊ߤ ? ׊߬ߨఛఏ ൫ݏఓఏכ  ? ିݏ ఓఏ כ൯ ൒ ߨఛఏ ൫ݏఓఏᇱ  ? ିݏ ఓఏ כ൯ ? ׊ݏఓఏ   
Where;  ݏିఓఏ כ  is the Nash equilibrium best response strategies of the other players  ݏఓఏᇱis any alternative strategy of player ߠ 
4. Case Study 
In this section, the previously developed methodology is applied to a hypothetical Far East- 
Northern Europe liner service loop. The Far East-Northern Europe liner shipping market is 
selected due to its more balanced market share among the liner shipping alliances. The 
market supply shares of the alliances comparisons according to main route areas are given in 
the figure 2.  
 
Figure-2 Market shares of the liner shipping alliance supply capacities 
Source: Own eloborations based on (Alphaliner, 2015) data 
This study assumes the liner shipping service of the Global alliances as identical with routes 
and port of calls and each alliance utilises a certain average ship sizes on the given liner 
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shipping service route. The route consists of, including East bound and West bound, 13 
voyages between 14 port of calls namely; Qingdao, Kwangyang, Busan, Shanghai, Yantian, 
Singapore, Algericas, Hamburg, Rotterdam, Le Havre, Algericas, Singapore, Yantian, 
Qingdao. Due to the Qingdao port called second time at the end of the round trip it is 
excluded from port of calls and the total port of calls for one round trip is accepted as 13. 
The visual illustration of the identically assumed Far East- Northern Europe liner service 
loop is illustrated as following.      
 
Figure 3 ± Typical Far East-Northern Europe liner container shipping service 
For the given service loop, the current average freight rate is identified as $650/TEU from 
2015 Shanghai-Rotterdam and Rotterdam- Shanghai rates of the world container index data. 
Thus, the market slope values of the alliances are determined as ܾଶெ ൌ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ܾீ଺ ൌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ܾ஼௄௒ுா ൌ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ܾைଷ ൌ  ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? and the ܽ value is given as 900. It is 
assumed that the round trip time of the service loops are the same for all shipping alliances 
and considered as 30 days for the West Bound and 40 days for the East Bound. The bunker 
prices are considered as constant annually and $200 per tonne. It is assumed that all shipping 
services have annual 15 days (2 weeks) delays. The port charges are accepted as $15,000 for 
all port of calls and all ship sizes. In addition, the voyage costs, the capital cost and the 
operational costs are calculated based on the deployed ship sizes.  The annual additional 
costs of the players are considered approximately same and as $500,000 ship/year. The 
present market characteristic of the given liner container shipping service is shown in the 
Table. 2 including average ship sizes, weekly demands, and capacity utilisation rates, and 
average profits per TEU.   
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Table.2 Properties of the liner shipping alliances for the service route 
Properties 2M G6 CKYHE O3 
Av. Ship Size 2015(TEU) 14,000 12,300 10,800 13,400 
Weekly Demand (TEU) 11,167 10,400 8,667 11,750 
Market Share of Demand 26% 25% 21% 28% 
Capacity Utilisation Rate 79.76% 84.55% 80.24% 87.68% 
Number of Port of Calls 13 13 13 13 
Round Trip (Days) 70 70 70 70 
Number of Ships 10 10 10 10 
Annual Round Trip per Ship 5 5 5 5 
Average Profit per TEU ($) 136 133 74 177 
     
Source: (Drewry, 2016) 
6. Scenario Building 
In order to analyse the competition state of the market 2 years after from present, a market 
scenario is generated. In this scenario, the bunker prices will climb up to $250 per tonne. It 
is assumed that demand for each service will increase 3.4% annually. The round trip days, 
number of ships on the service, annual round trip per ship, number of port of calls, port 
charges, and annual additional costs are assumed as same as the present. It is proposed that 
CKYHE is the first rational player who needs to take a rational action regarding to capacity 
deployment decision-making due to its lower profit. Then the G6 is the second rational 
player and the 2M and O3 are adaptive players. It is assumed that the competition game is 
static and the players determine their best strategies by consideration of the tactical strategy 
behaviours of the competitor shipping alliances.   
According to the given scenario each player has 2 available strategy options given below:  
1- No average ship capacity increase on the current average ship capacity 
2- 2000 TEU capacity increase on the existing average ship capacity 
Therefore, the pure strategy combinations of the alliances for capacity deployment decision 
making are given as following:  ሺݏே௢ூ௡௖௥௘௔௦௘஼௄௒ுா  ? ݏே௢ூ௡௖௥௘௔௦௘ீ଺  ? ݏே௢ூ௡௖௥௘௔௦௘ଶெ  ? ݏே௢ூ௡௖௥௘௔௦௘ைଷ ሻ ؔ ܥ݋ܾ݉݅݊ܽݐ݅݋݊ ? ሺݏே௢ூ௡௖௥௘௔௦௘஼௄௒ுா  ? ݏାଶ଴଴଴்ா௎ீ଺  ? ݏே௢ூ௡௖௥௘௔௦௘ଶெ  ? ݏே௢ூ௡௖௥௘௔௦௘ைଷ ሻ ؔ ܥ݋ܾ݉݅݊ܽݐ݅݋݊ ? 
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ሺݏே௢ூ௡௖௥௘௔௦௘஼௄௒ுா  ? ݏே௢ூ௡௖௥௘௔௦௘ீ଺  ? ݏାଶ଴଴଴்ா௎ଶெ  ? ݏே௢ூ௡௖௥௘௔௦௘ைଷ ሻ ؔ ܥ݋ܾ݉݅݊ܽݐ݅݋݊ ? ሺݏே௢ூ௡௖௥௘௔௦௘஼௄௒ுா  ? ݏே௢ூ௡௖௥௘௔௦௘ீ଺  ? ݏே௢ூ௡௖௥௘௔௦௘ଶெ  ? ݏାଶ଴଴଴்ா௎ைଷ ሻ ؔ ܥ݋ܾ݉݅݊ܽݐ݅݋݊ ? ሺݏே௢ூ௡௖௥௘௔௦௘஼௄௒ுா  ? ݏାଶ଴଴଴்ா௎ீ଺  ? ݏାଶ଴଴଴்ா௎ଶெ  ? ݏே௢ூ௡௖௥௘௔௦௘ைଷ ሻ ؔ ܥ݋ܾ݉݅݊ܽݐ݅݋݊ ? ሺݏே௢ூ௡௖௥௘௔௦௘஼௄௒ுா  ? ݏାଶ଴଴଴்ா௎ீ଺  ? ݏே௢ூ௡௖௥௘௔௦௘ଶெ  ? ݏାଶ଴଴଴்ா௎ைଷ ሻ ؔ ܥ݋ܾ݉݅݊ܽݐ݅݋݊ ? ሺݏே௢ூ௡௖௥௘௔௦௘஼௄௒ுா  ? ݏே௢ூ௡௖௥௘௔௦௘ீ଺  ? ݏାଶ଴଴଴்ா௎ଶெ  ? ݏାଶ଴଴଴்ா௎ைଷ ሻ ؔ ܥ݋ܾ݉݅݊ܽݐ݅݋݊ ? ሺݏே௢ூ௡௖௥௘௔௦௘஼௄௒ுா  ? ݏାଶ଴଴଴்ா௎ீ଺  ? ݏାଶ଴଴଴்ா௎ଶெ  ? ݏାଶ଴଴଴்ா௎ைଷ ሻ ؔ ܥ݋ܾ݉݅݊ܽݐ݅݋݊ ? ሺݏାଶ଴଴଴்ா௎஼௄௒ுா  ? ݏାଶ଴଴଴்ா௎ீ଺  ? ݏାଶ଴଴଴்ா௎ଶெ  ? ݏାଶ଴଴଴்ா௎ைଷ ሻ ؔ ܥ݋ܾ݉݅݊ܽݐ݅݋݊ ? ሺݏାଶ଴଴଴்ா௎஼௄௒ுா  ? ݏே௢ூ௡௖௥௘௔௦௘ீ଺  ? ݏାଶ଴଴଴்ா௎ଶெ  ? ݏାଶ଴଴଴்ா௎ைଷ ሻ ؔ ܥ݋ܾ݉݅݊ܽݐ݅݋݊ ? ? ሺݏାଶ଴଴଴்ா௎஼௄௒ுா  ? ݏାଶ଴଴଴்ா௎ீ଺  ? ݏே௢ூ௡௖௥௘௔௦௘ଶெ  ? ݏାଶ଴଴଴்ா௎ைଷ ሻ ؔ ܥ݋ܾ݉݅݊ܽݐ݅݋݊ ? ? ሺݏାଶ଴଴଴்ா௎஼௄௒ுா  ? ݏାଶ଴଴଴்ா௎ீ଺  ? ݏାଶ଴଴଴்ா௎ଶெ  ? ݏே௢ூ௡௖௥௘௔௦௘ைଷ ሻ ؔ ܥ݋ܾ݉݅݊ܽݐ݅݋݊ ? ? ሺݏାଶ଴଴଴்ா௎஼௄௒ுா  ? ݏே௢ூ௡௖௥௘௔௦௘ீ଺  ? ݏே௢ூ௡௖௥௘௔௦௘ଶெ  ? ݏାଶ଴଴଴்ா௎ைଷ ሻ ؔ ܥ݋ܾ݉݅݊ܽݐ݅݋݊ ? ? ሺݏାଶ଴଴଴்ா௎஼௄௒ுா  ? ݏே௢ூ௡௖௥௘௔௦௘ீ଺  ? ݏାଶ଴଴଴்ா௎ଶெ  ? ݏே௢ூ௡௖௥௘௔௦௘ைଷ ሻ ؔ ܥ݋ܾ݉݅݊ܽݐ݅݋݊ ? ? ሺݏାଶ଴଴଴்ா௎஼௄௒ுா  ? ݏାଶ଴଴଴்ா௎ீ଺  ? ݏே௢ூ௡௖௥௘௔௦௘ଶெ  ? ݏே௢ூ௡௖௥௘௔௦௘ைଷ ሻ ؔ ܥ݋ܾ݉݅݊ܽݐ݅݋݊ ? ? ሺݏାଶ଴଴଴்ா௎஼௄௒ுா  ? ݏே௢ூ௡௖௥௘௔௦௘ீ଺  ? ݏே௢ூ௡௖௥௘௔௦௘ଶெ  ? ݏே௢ூ௡௖௥௘௔௦௘ைଷ ሻ ؔ ܥ݋ܾ݉݅݊ܽݐ݅݋݊ ? ? 
The Cournot-Nash complete information quadropoly game model is generated on available 
commercial software called GamePlan 3.7 and illustrated in figure 4. The game model of the 
given case study scenario includes following elements:   
x The name and order of the players, and their strategy options 
x The decision node connections of the players 
x The pay offs of the player for each strategy combinations 
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Figure 4 ± Game model of the case study 
7. Results 
The quadropolistic analysis of the capacity provides many results regarding to tactical 
competition strategy outcomes. These results includes market freight rates, costs of TEU 
transported for all players, profit distribution of the players according to selected strategy 
combinations, Nash equilibrium point of the strategy combinations. In addition, the results 
of the model provide annual cost elements, revenue, and profit comparisons of the 
competitor shipping alliances at the equilibrium point. Therefore by applying this model it is 
possible to reach financial outcome of the chosen competitive investment strategies. In 
figure 5, the changes of the freight rates of the market according to chosen strategy 
combinations are given. It is also possible to understand revenue changes of the players from 
the freight rates.  Based on the given freight rates, it is understood that capacity increase 
investment in the current market situation further reduces the market freight rates and 
revenues of the liner container shipping alliances.  While the strategy combination 1 is 
providing the highest freight rates, the strategy combination 9 provides the lowest freight 
rates and revenue.  
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Figure 5 ± Freight rates according to strategy combinations 
The methodology applied in this study provides changes of the costs per TEU transported of 
the alliances for each strategy combination. The cost per TEU changes of the alliances based 
on the strategy combinations are given in figure 6. According to determined cost behaviours, 
the CKYHE shipping alliance has competitive cost disadvantage against other shipping 
alliances for all strategy combinations. On the other hand, for all players, whilst the capacity 
increase decision increases the costs, the no capacity increase investment decision reduces 
the costs.   
 
Figure 6 ±Costs per TEU transported according to strategy combinations 
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The figure 7 illustrates the profit distribution of the shipping alliances in a 3D form 
according to each given strategy combinations. From the given figure it is possible to see the 
deep and peak points of the profit distributions for each shipping alliance.  
 
Figure 7 ± Profit distribution according to strategies of the alliances 
The figure 8 provides the Nash equilibrium solution results of the game. The strategy 
combination 1 is determined as the equilibrium point of the game which is illustrated with a 
complete straight line from the node of the player 1 to player 4. Also, the results on the 
GamePlan 3.7 software provides some detailed numerical outcomes of the tactical strategy 
selection of the alliances7KH ³S´ V\PEROs shown in the figure 8 are the probabilities of 
each move at each game node. As a consequence of the utilisation of the Cournot-Nash pure 
strategy solution is utilised, p values found as only equal to 0 and 1.  Another given symbol 
³H´LVWKHH[SHFWHGSD\RIIs of the strategy choices between decision QRGHV³(´UHSUHVHQWV
WKH H[SHFWHG SD\ RIIV RI HDFK SOD\HU DW HDFK QRGH ³8´ VKRZV WKH ]HUR VXP XWLOLWLHV SD\
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Figure 8 ± Nash Equilibrium solution of the alliance quadropoly game 
After determination of the equilibrium point of the game, the financial situations of the 
alliances are comparatively shown in figure 9. According to results the O3 alliance is 
determined as the most competitive shipping alliance. 
 
Figure 9 ± Annual costs, revenue and profit of the alliances in equilibrium point 
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8. Conclusion 
This study addresses the development a game theoretical analysis tool for the liner container 
shipping alliance competition on a particular liner service loop. The study integrates 
shipping economics practices with capacity deployment related tactical decision making 
concepts. In this study, it is clearly emphasised that the capacity deployment decision 
making on a specific liner service loop should include the competitive behaviour of 
competitors. According to the obtained results, O3 shipping alliance is determined as the 
most competitive shipping alliance and CKYHE shipping alliance is found as the least 
competitive shipping alliance. Recent merge of the Cosco- &6&/DQG&RVFR¶VGHFLVLRQWREH
a part of O3 shipping alliance is supporting the results of this study.  
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